Risk-adjusted valuation of the current military retirement and the CY2018 retirement system by Heil, Adam N.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-06
Risk-adjusted valuation of the current military
retirement and the CY2018 retirement system
Heil, Adam N.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
RISK-ADJUSTED VALUATION OF THE CURRENT 









Thesis Advisor:  Amilcar Menichini 
Second Reader: Robert Eger 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2016 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
RISK-ADJUSTED VALUATION OF THE CURRENT MILITARY 
RETIREMENT AND THE CY2018 RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Adam N. Heil 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This paper analyzes the U.S. military’s choice to transition to the blended retirement system in 2018. 
All service members will be grandfathered into the current system but those with less than 12 years of 
service will be able to change from the legacy cliff-vested annuity to a pension that includes a reduced 
annuity, a 401(k)-type matched investment, and a career continuation bonus. The method used to value the 
two systems leverages the assumptions made by the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization 
Commission and RAND. However, it also incorporates risk into the calculation when valuing the annuity 
and continuation bonus portions of the retirement systems by using historical Department of Defense 
retention curves. All military members who do not intend to complete 20 years of service should switch to 
the blended system to derive at least some retirement value from their time in the military. Of the 
remaining population intending to complete at least 20 years of service, all service members—save for 







14. SUBJECT TERMS  
military retirement, retirement reform, blended retirement 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
63 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 




Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
RISK-ADJUSTED VALUATION OF THE CURRENT MILITARY 
RETIREMENT AND THE CY2018 RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
 
 
Adam N. Heil 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 2001 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 























Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv 




This paper analyzes the U.S. military’s choice to transition to the blended 
retirement system in 2018. All service members will be grandfathered into the current 
system but those with less than 12 years of service will be able to change from the legacy 
cliff-vested annuity to a pension that includes a reduced annuity, a 401(k)-type matched 
investment, and a career continuation bonus. The method used to value the two systems 
leverages the assumptions made by the Military Compensation and Retirement 
Modernization Commission and RAND. However, it also incorporates risk into the 
calculation when valuing the annuity and continuation bonus portions of the retirement 
systems by using historical Department of Defense retention curves. All military 
members who do not intend to complete 20 years of service should switch to the blended 
system to derive at least some retirement value from their time in the military. Of the 
remaining population intending to complete at least 20 years of service, all service 
members—save for enlisted members with six or more years of service—benefit from the 
change to the new blended pension. 
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Following the research done by the Military Compensation and Retirement 
Modernization Commission (MCRMC), the Department of Defense (DOD) announced a 
change to the current retirement system that will take effect on January 1, 2018. All 
service members who enter after that date will be enrolled in the new program and all 
those already serving at the time the policy goes into effect will be grandfathered into the 
legacy system. Those members with less than 12 years of service will have the choice to 
“opt-in” to the new retirement system.  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the retirement program alternatives of 
those service members who will have the option of transitioning to the new system. The 
MCRMC and RAND have focused primarily on the cost to the government and retention 
implications. The retirement commission has determined that the new system will at least 
match the legacy system in terms of net present value (NPV) for incoming military 
members, but the members who will have the choice to switch must make a complicated 
decision. 
Very junior personnel with limited financial backgrounds will be forced to make 
an assessment that will impact their financial wellbeing for the remainder of their lives. 
To aid in this decision, service members will be provided compensation and fiscal 
education in the summer of 2016, including a NPV valuation of retirement options. 
Utility theory stipulates that a rational decision maker faced with outcomes of 
different choices will prefer actions that maximize expected utility (Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 2007). This thesis attempts to capture the value of the two systems using 
the assumptions of the retirement commission when computing comparative NPVs and 
introducing the element of risk into the two pensions. Future inflation, market return, 
personal discount rates, life expectancy, continuation pay, and 401(k) contribution 
amounts have been the components of previous NPV calculations. This thesis examines 
the career retention curves, derives risk rates for each year group cohort between 0–11 
 2 
years of service, and then adjusts the NPV by the calculated rate. Choosing to transition 
to the new retirement system is a very personal decision; this paper provides information 
to help make it an informed decision. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given the opportunity, should a service member switch from the legacy 
retirement system to the new blended system effective January 1, 2018? 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This subject matter of this thesis is only applicable to the following personnel: 
1. Members who joined the military before January 1, 2018 
2. Members with less than 12 years of service 
3. Members who intend to stay in the military until at least 20 years of 
service 
Service members who do not meet #1 or #2 do not have an option to exercise and service 
members who do not meet #3 should always choose to switch to the new system to derive 
some retirement benefit from their service. 
D. METHODOLOGY  
A mathematical model is used to calculate the NPV for each retirement program 
based on the variables that influence the pensions. Chapter III discusses the details of the 
methodology. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH 
Chapter II provides the history of the United States military retirement plan, 
details of the current system, and differences in the new program. 
Chapter III discusses the methodology used to calculate the NPV of each 
retirement system and the variables that go into those calculations. In addition, the 
limitations incurred by the assumptions of the model are explored. 
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Chapter IV delivers the results of the models, compares the two retirement 
systems, and interprets the results. 
Chapter V offers recommendations based on the analysis of the data.  
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II. HISTORY AND CHANGES TO THE MILITARY 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
This chapter explores the beginnings of the military pension plan and the 
transformation to the current system. In addition, the blended retirement system that will 
become the standard plan on January 1, 2018 is reviewed. 
A. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM 
English pension law was the basis for colonial pension legislation and provided 
for soldiers in the case of disability (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2015b). Those wounded 
in the Indian campaigns who could not earn a livelihood were provided aid in addition to 
families of soldiers who died in military service. The inaugural military pension law in 
the United States was passed on August 26, 1776, introducing the concept of half pay for 
life. 
Disability pensions were the root of the current system, but the military 
transitioned to a non-disability model for four reasons listed by the Office of the Actuary: 
1. To stay competitive as an employer with the civilian sector 
2. To keep promotion opportunities open for junior personnel 
3. To afford economic security for its members 
4. To provide an experienced pool of personnel available for recall 
Pension benefits for the military member ebbed and flowed throughout the 
Revolutionary, Civil, and World Wars based on force shaping needs and the overall 
economic health of the country. Disparate systems for officer and enlisted were 
eventually paralleled and differences between service-specific plans were eliminated 
(DOD Office of the Actuary, 2015b). 
From inception to current policy, over 60 legal changes to the military 
compensation and pension policy have occurred. These reforms can be categorized in 
terms of recruitment/retention, administrative, and economic agendas, which have 
reflected the nation’s needs, public opinion, and economic standing. While some of the 
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restructurings applied to multiple categories, usually only one appeared to be the driving 
factor in the passing of the particular piece of legislature. All changes and reforms listed 
in the following sections have been paraphrased from DOD Office of the Actuary 
(2015b). 
1. Recruitment/Retention 
• 1636—Pilgrims at Plymouth decree that soldiers returning maimed should 
be maintained for life. 
• 1776—The first national pension law is passed, promising disability 
payments of half-pay for life. 
• 1780—Pensions based on service by itself (non-disability) of half-pay for 
life is offered to officers who served to the end of the war. 
• 1790—The Act of 1790 establishes a defined pay structure for the 
military. 
• 1805—Disability pensions are granted to those who became disabled due 
to wounds received in prior military service. 
• 1855—Involuntary separation due to performance with partial pay of 
Navy officers is authorized. 
• 1861—The first major voluntary retirement act, not based on disability, is 
passed for all officers after 40 years of service and involuntary retirements 
for age are authorized. 
• 1862—Involuntary retirements for years of service is authorized. 
• 1870—Voluntary retirement is offered to officers after 30 years of service 
at a rate of 75 percent pay. 
• 1916—Navy selection boards are established for promotion to rear 
admiral, captain, and commander. In addition, the Fleet Naval Reserve is 
created to provide a pool of people able to be recalled in the case of a 
national emergency (P.L. 64-241).  
• 1925—Retainer pay for Navy and Marine Corps enlistees is provided at 
20 years of service when transitioning to the Fleet Naval Reserve. 
• 1926—Service in grade replaces age in grade for Navy selection boards 
(P.L. 69-413). 
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• 1938—Navy selection boards instituted for all officer grades above the 
rank of lieutenant, limits set on years of service for lieutenant commanders 
through captains, and voluntary retirement at 20 years of service provided 
(P.L. 75-706). 
• 1958—The Uniformed Services Pay Act is the beginning of regular basic 
pay increased aimed at making personnel pay competitive (P.L. 85-422). 
• 1967—The Act of 1967 introduces new basic pay adjustment procedures 
that are still used today (P.L. 90-207). 
• 1981—The Department of Defense Authorization Act increases basic pay 
further in order to close the gap with civilian wages (P.L. 96-342). 
• 1993—The National Defense Authorization Act enables Selected Reserve 
members to apply for a transfer to the retired reserve in an effort to 
downsize the force (P.L. 102-484). 
• 2008—The retirement age for a reserve retirement below age 60 is 
reduced by three months for every 90-day aggregate of service performed 
with a 10-year limit (P.L. 110-181). 
 
2. Administrative 
• 1790—The Secretary of War becomes the principle administrator of the 
military pension, taking over from the States. 
• 1849—The Department of the Interior assumes control of the military 
pension from the Bureau of Pensions. 
• 1867—Disability retirement is provided for Navy and Marine Corps 
enlisted personnel. 
• 1873—Navy officers are offered the same 75 percent pension given to the 
Army and Marine Corps in 1870. 
• 1885—Non-disability pension extended to Army and Marine Corps 
Enlistees for voluntary retirement after 30 years of service with 75 percent 
pay. 
• 1899—Navy enlisted are offered the same non-disability pension granted 
for the Army and Marine Corps in 1885. 
• 1930—The Veterans Administration (VA) assumes control of the military 
pension from the Department of the Interior. 
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• 1947—The Officer Personnel Act aligns the Army and Air Force with the 
Navy officer selection process and offers severance pay for those officers 
who fail to promote and are not eligible for retirement (P.L. 80–381). 
• 1948—The Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization 
Act standardizes non disability retirement laws for all the services and 
establishes a non-disability retirement program for reserve personnel (P.L. 
80-810). 
• 1949—The Career Compensation Act standardizes disability ratings and 
schedules by the VA (P.L. 81-351). 
• 1969—An additional one percent is added to cost-of-living adjustment 
(COLA) to compensate for a five month lag in benefits increase (P.L. 91-
179). 
• 1977—COLA adjustments are made every 6 months and the additional 
one percent from 1969 is eliminated (P.L. 94-440). 
• 1981—Once-a-year COLA increases are implemented (P.L. 97-35). 
• 1984—Entitlements are paid at the beginning of the subsequent month 
rather than at the end of the month (P.L. 98-369). In addition, retired and 
retainer pay are paid on the first day of each month (P.L. 111-383). 
• 1986—Full COLA is restored for those members who decline the 
CSB/Redux option (P.L. 106-65). 
• 2003—The required reserve service eligibility for retired pay is reduced 
from eight to six years and a 10 percent retired pay bonus is established 
for enlisted members determined to have demonstrated extraordinary 
heroism in the line of duty (P.L. 107-314). 
• 2003—The Concurrent Receipt Law is passed, addressing the offset to 
military retired pay due to receipt of VA disability compensation (P.L. 
108-136). 
• 2006—The 75 percent cap on non-disability retirements for over 30 years 
of service is lifted (P.L. 109-364). 
• 2008—An independent three-member DOD Retirement Board of 
Actuaries is established (P.L. 110-181). 
• 2011—The 100 percent cap on disability retirements for over 40 years of 
service is lifted (P.L. 111-383). 
• 2014—Full COLA is restored for the disabled and survivors of members 
who die on active duty (P.L. 113-76). In addition, the president 
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grandfathers all military members who entered service prior to January 1, 
2014 from the reduced COLA program (Senate Bill 25). 
 
3. Economic 
• 1818—Revolutionary War veterans are provided relief from previously 
discounted claims due to an increasing treasury and political controversy. 
• 1832—Revolutionary War veterans are provided full-pay for life, 
regardless of need. 
• 1836—Revolutionary War widows are extended the pension benefits. 
• 1935—The Military Retirement system is moved to an unfunded or “pay-
as-you-go” basis. 
• 1958—Retired pay is increased six percent in order to catch up from the 
last time retired pay was increased in 1955 (P.L. 85-422). 
• 1963—A permanent system of increasing retired pay is established based 
on an economic formula (P.L. 88-132). 
• 1965—Adjustments are made to the COLA formula, linking it to the 
Consumer Price Index (P.L. 89-132). 
• 1980—High-3 (HI-3) is introduced, where the 2.5 percent per year is 
multiplied by the average of the highest 36 months of pay rather than final 
pay when computing the annuity payment (P.L. 96-513). 
• 1982—COLA is temporarily decreased (P.L. 97-253). 
• 1983—The Military Retirement Fund is established (P.L. 98-94). 
• 1984—COLA is set to the percentage increase in the average CPIs for 
July, August, and September over the averaged indexes of the prior year 
(P.L. 98-270). 
• 1986—Redux is enacted, reducing the 2.5 percent multiplier to 2 percent 
but then readjusting at age 62 to a level had the 2.5 percent been used for 
each year of service (P.L. 99-348). In addition, COLA increases for 
members entering the service after July 31, 1986 are reduced by one 
percent. At age 62, a catch-up mechanism is used to increase the amount 
payable had full adjustments been made (P.L. 99–348). Furthermore, 
separate normal cost percentages are mandated for the active duty and 
reserve retirements (P.L. 99-661). 
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• 1999—In a reversing move, DOD converts those members under the 
Redux system back to HI-3. At the 15-year point, service members have 
the choice to stay with HI-3, or opt into the Redux program. A $30,000 
bonus is provided when transitioning to Career Status Bonus (CSB)/Redux 
that includes a 5-year service obligation (P.L. 106-65). 
• 2000—Basic pay increases are linked to the Employment Cost Index and 
the President is authorized to adjust the amount (P.L. 106-65). 
• 2013—The Bipartisan Budget Act makes changes to COLA, reducing the 
rate to COLA less one percent until age 62 when the rate would be 
restored to an amount had there been no reduction (P.L. 113-67). 
• 2018—The Blended Retirement System is launched, providing a matched 
401(k)-type investment and reducing the annuity multiplier from 2.5 
percent to 2 percent.  
The timeline in Figure 1 shows where these changes have fallen over time, 
punctuated by relevant wars. 
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Figure 1.  Military Retirement Timeline 
 
 
B. LEGACY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
The current system is a 20-year cliff-vested defined benefit annuity (DOD Office 
of the Actuary, 2015b). The multiplier is 2.5 percent per year of service and the average 
of the highest 36 months of basic pay (HI-3) is used for the calculation. Service members 
who entered before 2014 receive full COLA and members who entered in 2014 or later 
receive a reduced COLA of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) less one percent until the 
catch-up mechanism at age 62. The CSB/Redux option at the 15 years of service mark is 
available, reducing the multiplier to two percent for each year of service and reducing to 
COLA until the first day of the month after the retiree’s 62nd birthday. 
Basic pay increases while on active duty attempt to mirror the private sector and 
are influenced by the health of the American economy. After FY2006, increases were 
tied to the Employment Cost Index but the President has the authority embedded in the 
law to adjust the pay scale increases to meet recruitment and retention needs (DOD 
Office of the Actuary, 2015b). 
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C. BLENDED RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
In response to rising personnel costs and a changing work force that has different 
career values, the MCRMC was tasked with changing the retirement system to remain 
competitive in compensation. The majority of the private sector has transitioned from 
cliff-vested annuity retirement packages to a 401(k)-type program that is mobile between 
employers. At least 83 percent of the military does not make it to 20 years of service and 
a matching-type 401(k) program provides at least some retirement compensation for 
careers that do not span 20 years (Maldon, 2015). Under the new system there are three 
components, which are described in the following sections. 
1. Defined Contribution 
According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), service members 
will automatically be enrolled in the Thrift Saving Plan (TSP) with three percent of their 
basic pay going into the Roth type account (2015). Only after the completion of financial 
literacy training can the member change the contribution amount or change the TSP 
account to a traditional type. OMB further explains that DOD will contribute one percent 
of basic pay every month, vesting upon completion of two years of service; after four 
years of service, DOD will match up to five percent of basic pay in the TSP account. 
2. Defined Benefit 
The cliff-vested annuity is available for service members who make it to 20 years 
of service with the difference being a two percent multiplier for all and a reduction to 
COLA less one percent for those who entered the service before January 1, 2014 (OMB, 
2015). 
3. Continuation Pay 
In response to potential retention impacts, the service member may be offered a 
one-time retention pay determined by the individual services up to 22 times basic pay at 
12 years of service (OMB, 2015). 
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All members serving on January 1, 2018 will be grandfathered into the legacy 
system and those with less than 12 years of service will have two years to “opt-in” to the 
new system. This period of time will allow for financial literacy training because a 
decision to opt-in is not reversible. Service members joining on or after January 1, 2018 
will be enrolled in the new retirement system (OMB, 2015). Tables 1 and 2 display the 
differences in the retirement systems. 
Table 1.   Retirement System Properties 
Benefit System HI-3 CSB/Redux CY2018 
Multiplier 2.5% per YOS 2% per YOS** 2% per YOS 
COLA Adjustment Full CPI* CPI less 1%** CPI less 1% 
Bonus - $30,000 5x base pay*** 
TSP Matching - - Up to 5% per year 
*If service member entered prior to January 1, 2014. Otherwise CPI less 1% until age 62. 
**Multiplier and COLA is adjusted to catch-up at age 62. 
***Service dependent and only proposed at this time. 
Adapted from OMB (2015). 






Before 62        After 62 
CY2018 
Multiplier 
20 50.0%    40.0%                50.0% 40% 
21 52.5%    43.5%                52.5% 42% 
22 55.0%    47.0%                55.0% 44% 
23 57.5%    50.5%                57.5% 46% 
24 60.0%    54.0%                60.0% 48% 
25 62.5%    57.5%                62.5% 50% 
26 65.0%    61.0%                65.0% 52% 
27 67.5%    64.5%                67.5% 54% 
28 70.0%    68.0%                70.0% 56% 
29 72.5%    71.5%                72.5% 58% 
30 75.0%    75.0%                75.0% 60% 
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In order to compare the two retirement systems in a way that captures the 
transformation of money over time and personal values, a multi-step process ending with 
a risk-adjusted NPV determination is used. The baseline for all calculations is the year of 
retirement and each of the segments of the blended system are calculated separately and 
then aggregated to compare to the legacy system. 
1. Defined Benefit 
Each retirement system features an annuity based on the HI-3 base pay multiplied 
by either 2.5 percent or 2 percent. The present value of the annuity from retirement age to 
life expectancy is computed using the personal discount rate. Then, a risk multiplier is 
incorporated to compensate for the likelihood of the service member making it to 20 
years of service. 
Step 1) HI-3 is calculated using the assumed pay schedule 
HI-3= [(year 18 pay)+(year 19 pay)+(year 20 pay)]/3 
Step 2) PV of the annuity is calculated using the HI-3 as the “C,” life 
expectancy minus retirement age as the “n” periods, and the personal 
discount rate as the “r.” 
PV= C*{[1-(1+r)^-n]/r} 
Step 3) The risk factor for the year group cohort is calculated by dividing 
the survival percentage of the service at year 20 by the survival percentage 
of the cohort 
RF= (20 year %)/(cohort %) 
Step 4) The balance from step 2 is risk adjusted by multiplying it to the 
risk factor from step 3 
RAPV= (step 3)*(step 4) 
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2. Defined Contribution 
The unique portion of the blended system is the matched 401(k) style retirement 
benefit. For the first time in U.S. military pension history, service members who do not 
serve for at least 20 years will leave with some amount of retirement benefit. For this 
reason, any service member not intending to stay until 20 years of service should always 
switch to the blended system. 
In order to calculate this portion of the retirement benefit in a comparable way to 
the legacy retirement system, only the funds contributed by the government are 
considered in the evaluation. The retirement commission and RAND have included the 
funds contributed by the service member in recent studies, but this money is not 
considered relevant in this thesis. The money a service member chooses to save out of a 
paycheck is not germane when comparing these two retirement systems. 
Another assumption that needs to be made is the amount contributed by the 
service member in the defined contribution portion of the pension system. As little as one 
percent or as much as five percent will be matched by the government based on the 
member’s contribution. For the scope of this thesis (in parallel to the retirement 
commission and the RAND study), a three percent member contribution is assumed, 
yielding a four percent contribution by the government and invested in the TSP 2050 Life 
cycle Fund (Asch, Mattock, & Hosek, 2015). 
The government contributions are added and compounded until the age of 
retirement and then compounded until age 59.5. Then, the amount is discounted to the 
year of retirement. The risk factor is not incorporated because there is not cliff vesting in 
this portion of the benefit. 
Step 1) Contributions are added as the yearly “C,” compounded using the 
assumed market rate of return “x,” and discounted by the assumed 
inflation “i” up to retirement where “t” equals 20 minus the cohort year.  
Contribution= Sum of [C0*(1+(x-i))^t] + [C1*(1+(x-i))^(t-1)] + … + Ct 
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Step 2) FV of an investment is calculated using the balance from step 1 as 
the “C,” assumed market rate of return “x,” assumed inflation “i,” and 
59.5 minus the year of retirement as the “n” periods 
 FV= (step 1)*(1+(x-i))^n 
Step 3) The FV is discounted to the year of retirement using the balance 
from step 2 as the “C,” the personal discount rate as the “r,” and 59.5 
minus the year of retirement as the “n” periods 
PV= (step 2)/(1+r)^n 
3. Continuation Pay 
The mid-career bonus in the blended system has not been defined by each service 
and will likely change over time to compensate for force shaping needs. However, the 
initial targets set by RAND are used in this model as seen in Table 3 (3.37 months’ pay 
for enlisted members and 14 months’ pay for officers). As in the RAND study, it is 
assumed that the service member places the bonus in the TSP 2050 Life cycle Fund 
(Asch et al., 2015). The amount is compounded to age 59.5 and then discounted to the 
year of retirement. Then, as in the cliff-based annuity, it is risk adjusted based on the 
likelihood the service member will make it to 12 years of service. 
Table 3.   Continuation Pay Multipliers by Service 
 
Source: Asch et al. (2015). 
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The most current law passed stipulates a multiplier of 2.5 for all service members, 
but is under petition to be changed to the MCRMC recommended method where each 
service can adjust as needed for force shaping. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
suggested rates used by the retirement commission and RAND are used in the model with 
the expectation that the law will change to reflect those recommendations. 
Step 1) The bonus is calculated by multiplying the 12th year monthly pay 
by the assumed CP multiplier 
 Bonus= (12th year pay)*(bonus multiplier) 
Step 2) FV of an investment is calculated using the balance from step 1 as 
the “C,” assumed market rate of return “x,” assumed inflation “i,” and 
59.5 minus the year of 12 years of service as the “n” periods 
 FV= (step 1)*(1+(x-i))^n 
Step 3) The FV is discounted to the year of retirement using the balance 
from step 2 as the “C,” the personal discount rate as the “r,” and 59.5 
minus the year of retirement as the “n” periods 
 PV= (step 2)/(1+r)^n 
Step 4) The risk factor for the year group cohort is calculated by dividing 
the survival percentage of the service at year 12 by the survival percentage 
of the cohort 
RF= (12 year %)/(cohort %) 
Step 5) The balance from step 3 is risk adjusted by multiplying it to the 
risk factor from step 4 
RAPV= (step 3)*(step 4) 
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B. YEARS OF SERVICE AND PROMOTION 
For the scope of this thesis, a few assumptions about the age and promotion 
schedule of a typical service member are made in order to simplify the model. These 
assumptions are consistent with the ones made by the retirement commission and the 
studies done by RAND. 
1. Enlisted members enter at age 18 
2. Officers enter at age 22 
3. Service members retire at 20 years of service 
4. Terminal rank for enlisted members is E-7 
5. Terminal rank of officers is O-5 
While career progression is unique for service members, there is an advancement 
sequence that approximates most careers. The minor differences from the baseline 
progression do not have a significant impact on the end valuation (Asch et al, 2015). In 
addition, both systems are evaluated using the same career progression.  
C. LIFE EXPECTANCY 
Using the assumption that the majority of enlisted members enter the military at 
age 18 and officers enter at age 22, the retirement age at the 20-year mark is 38 and 42 
years old, respectively. The Office of the Actuary publishes life expectancy charts for 
enlisted and officer members that use retirement age as an independent variable. It also 
separates calculations based on gender (Office of the Actuary, 2015a). 
Following the life expectancy chart for the assumed retirement ages and using a 
weighted average of the gender demographics of the enlisted and officer population 
within DOD yields the following (OSD, 2104): 
• Enlisted 
(85.2% x 79.7yo) + (14.8% x 82.5yo) = 80.1 years old 
• Officer 
(83.3% x 84.3yo) + (17.7% x 85.9yo) = 84.6 years old 
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D. INFLATION 
For the purposes of this thesis, the interest rate of 2.35 percent per year used by 
the retirement commission is assumed. 
E. MARKET RETURN 
One of the key variables in the blended retirement program is the projected rate of 
return on the invested portion. In order to provide a reasonable return rate that 
approximates the historical S&P 500 return, the retirement commission used the TSP Life 
cycle 2050 Fund with a 7.3 percent average return. This fund is spread across the G, F, C, 
S, and I Funds to provide diversification and is adjusted over time to meet changing risk 
profiles. When combined with the assumed 2.35 percent interest rate, the real rate of 
return is 4.95 percent. In agreement with the retirement commission, the L2050 Fund is 
used for the Defined Contribution and Continuation Pay portions of this thesis (Asch et 
al., 2015). 
F. PRESENT AND FUTURE VALUE 
Using the assumed interest rate, market rate of return, and the yearly periods, 
present and future values are calculated for each of the segments in the legacy and 
blended retirement systems as seen in Figures 2 and 3. The theory of compounding is 
used to evaluate monetary growth over time and discounting is used to adjust for the time 
value of money (Brealey, Meyers, & Allen, 2011). 
Figure 2.  Present Value Equation 
 




G. PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATE 
Experimental and non-experimental studies have measured the personal discount 
rate, which is the rate at which an individual will trade a current dollar for a future dollar 
(Cunha & Menichini, 2014). Included in these studies is an examination of the early 
1990s military drawdown and the introduction of the Voluntary Separation Incentive and 
the Selective Separation Benefit. The behavior of service members was evaluated when 
given a choice to have money in hand at the expense of their annuity. The results of the 
program were not what was expected; the “take rate” was far above the projected rate, 
illuminating this promising concept (Warner & Pleeter, 2001). 
The behavioral economic community has determined there are three actualities to 
the personal discount rate (D): 
1. Individuals do not discount all future values at the same rate 
2. D varies with the time delay of the reward or penalty 
3. D varies with personal characteristics 
The retirement commission and RAND use a personal discount rate of 12.7 
percent for enlisted members and 6.4 percent for officers. These assumptions are 
accepted for the purpose of this thesis (Asch et al, 2015). 
H. NET PRESENT VALUE 
The time value of money stipulates that a dollar in hand today is worth more than 
a dollar in the future because it could be used to make money in an investment vehicle 
and inflation diminishes its buying power over time. NPV is a tool that allows for a 
return-on-investment evaluation of a project or the comparison of multiple projects 
(Gallo, 2014). 
The equation for NPV is shown in Figure 4 and the output of this model does not 
represent a dollar amount the service member will likely see in a bank account. Rather, 
the NPVs are only useful in comparing options. The direction of difference between the 
pension systems and the magnitude of the difference provide guidance on the best fiscal 
course of action based on the assumed variables. 
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Figure 4.  Net Present Value Equation 
 
 
I. CAREER SURVIVAL RATES 
One of the differentiating features of this thesis is the introduction of risk into the 
valuation of the two pension systems (Luce & Krantz, 1971). Emphasis is placed on the 
Defined Benefit portion of the retirement plans, but the reality is that the majority of 
service members will never be eligible for the annuity. In addition to administrative 
reasons for leaving before 20 years of service, like failing to promote, and being 
discharged punitively, many service members choose to transition to the civilian sector 
for personal reasons, like quality of life and pay. In the end, only 17 percent of service 
members make it to the 20-year mark and are eligible for the defined annuity pension as 
seen in Figure 5 (Maldon, 2015). 
Figure 5.  Active Duty Retirement Curves 
 
Source: Asch et al. (2015). 
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The retention curves are different for the enlisted and officer population and even 
differ slightly between services. However, they all share a common shape, illustrating a 
steep loss rate in the first six years and then flattening as the member approaches 20 years 
of service. The odds that a service member with two years of service making it to 20 
years are significantly less than a service member with 10 years, regardless of 
demographic. For the purposes of this thesis, the Navy Active Component Enlisted and 
Officer retention curves are used to determine risk, displayed in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Navy Retention 
YOS Enlisted Officer 
1 87.0% 96.6% 
2 78.1% 94.5% 
3 59.6% 92.8% 
4 45.7% 91.9% 
5 34.8% 76.1% 
6 27.6% 63.8% 
7 22.4% 54.2% 
8 18.7% 46.1% 
9 15.8% 40.1% 
10 13.8% 35.8% 
11 12.4% 32.3% 
12 11.6% 30.3% 
13 11.0% 28.8% 
14 10.6% 27.8% 
15 10.3% 27.0% 
16 10.1% 26.6% 
17 10.1% 26.1% 
18 10.0% 25.9% 
19 9.9% 25.7% 
20 7.7% 20.3% 
*Active Component based on DRM simulations of the retention profile under the 
baseline by RAND (2015). 
  
 24 
J. MODELS, INPUTS, AND OUTPUTS 
Two models, one for enlisted and one for officers, were built in Excel. The inputs 
to the models are the following: 
• 2016 military pay schedule 
• 2015 retention rates 
• Age at entry 
• Life expectancy 
• Interest rate 
• Personal discount rate 
• Market return 
The outputs of the models are NPV’s for each year group cohort, comparing the 
legacy to the new retirement system. The actual number is not as important as the 
direction and magnitude of the difference between the two values. Based on the years of 
service, an enlisted member or officer can compare the risk-adjusted values of each 
system and use that to make a decision on whether to switch to the blended retirement 
program. 
K. SUMMARY 
The results of the model present a valuation useful in the decision-making process 
military members with less than 12 years of service will complete in 2018. This is a 
generalized model with assumptions made for the enlisted and officer community. The 
numbers output by the model are not suitable for financial expenditure planning, only for 
comparison purposes. However, the models do provide a base-line comparison of the 
retirement systems that goes beyond bank account balances and attempts to capture the 
holistic benefit or value of the systems. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Using the produced models for valuation, the following results are provided for 
enlisted members and officers. In addition, a sensitivity analysis is afforded for relevant 
input variables assuming all other variables are held constant. Since service members 
must proactively change to the blended system, the assumption for the valuations in this 
chapter is that the member remains grandfathered under the legacy system.  
A. VALUATION 
1. Enlisted 
Members from 0–5 years of service increase the value of their pension when 
switching to the blended system, with the most relative value changing for cohorts with 
0–2 years of service. Cohorts with 6–11 years of service realize an advantage by 
remaining under the legacy system, as shown in Table 5 and Figure 6. However, the 
magnitude of the advantage is less than the corresponding advantage junior service 
members see when switching to the blended system. 
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Table 5.   Enlisted Retirement Value 
Cohort Legacy Blend Delta % Difference 
0 YOS $18,124.95 $26,302.21 -$8,177.26 -45.12% 
1 YOS $20,200.22 $27,903.68 -$7,703.46 -38.14% 
2 YOS $26,450.33 $32,980.72 -$6,530.39 -24.69% 
3 YOS $34,490.12 $39,542.38 -$5,052.26 -14.65% 
4 YOS $45,296.76 $48,398.42 -$3,101.66 -6.85% 
5 YOS $57,249.84 $57,720.17 -$470.33 -0.82% 
6 YOS $70,506.63 $68,100.14 $2,406.48 3.41% 
7 YOS $84,208.93 $78,838.34 $5,370.59 6.38% 
8 YOS $100,141.79 $91,471.14 $8,670.65 8.66% 
9 YOS $114,209.50 $102,535.12 $11,674.39 10.22% 
10 YOS $127,093.73 $112,643.28 $14,450.45 11.37% 
11 YOS $136,320.94 $119,643.67 $16,677.27 12.23% 
 





All members from 0–11 years of service realize an advantage under the blended 
system as shown by Table 6 and Figure 7. The valuation indicates that switching to the 
blended system provides the most benefit to the junior service member with the most 
relative value change.  
Table 6.   Officer Retirement Value 
Cohort Legacy Blend Delta % Difference 
0 YOS $152,108.99 $216,634.14 -$64,525.15 -42.42% 
1 YOS $155,424.11 $219,328.05 -$63,903.94 -41.12% 
2 YOS $158,270.70 $221,575.54 -$63,304.84 -40.00% 
3 YOS $159,872.53 $222,383.14 -$62,510.61 -39.10% 
4 YOS $193,019.14 $255,381.79 -$62,362.65 -32.31% 
5 YOS $230,153.32 $289,280.24 -$59,126.92 -25.69% 
6 YOS $270,945.90 $327,114.43 -$56,168.53 -20.73% 
7 YOS $318,393.72 $371,763.42 -$53,369.70 -16.76% 
8 YOS $366,351.28 $417,117.50 -$50,766.22 -13.86% 
9 YOS $410,583.75 $458,658.20 -$48,074.45 -11.71% 
10 YOS $454,257.47 $499,802.33 -$45,544.86 -10.03% 
11 YOS $485,642.53 $528,004.37 -$42,361.85 -8.72% 
 




Each of the variables in the model has different effects on the valuation of the 
retirement systems. In order to capture the significance of each variable, a sensitivity 
analysis is conducted to determine the critical level that changes the NPV determination 
with all other variables held constant. 
1. Market Return 
A 4.95 percent is the base real rate of return (L2050 Fund return-interest) and as 
the rate goes up, the blended system increases in value. An increase or decrease to the 
critical level indicated in the table changes the NPV determination to stay with the legacy 
pension or switch to the blended system. The critical return rate drives both models to an 
equal valuation as displayed in Figures 8 and 9. 
Enlisted members with 0–5 years of service should prefer the legacy retirement 
system if the real rate of return falls below the values in Table 7. Similarly, those with 6–
11 years of service should switch to the blended pension is the rate rises above the values 
in Table 7.  
For example, an enlisted member with two years of service should value the 
blended retirement system over the legacy pension assuming the 4.95 percent real rate of 
return. This valuation hold true until the real rate of return drops to below 1.6 percent, at 
which point the member should value the legacy retirement higher than the blended 
system. 
Officers in all cohorts should choose the legacy system if return rates drop below 
the values in Table 8.  
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Table 7.   Enlisted Market Return Sensitivity 
Cohort Critical % 
0 YOS 0.2% 
1 YOS 0.6% 
2 YOS 1.6% 
3 YOS 2.7% 
4 YOS 3.7% 
5 YOS 4.7% 
6 YOS 5.8% 
7 YOS 6.6% 
8 YOS 7.5% 
9 YOS 8.1% 
10 YOS 8.7% 
11 YOS 9.2% 
 




Table 8.   Officer Market Return Sensitivity 
Cohort Critical % 
0 YOS 0.5% 
1 YOS 0.5% 
2 YOS 0.6% 
3 YOS 0.7% 
4 YOS 1.0% 
5 YOS 1.5% 
6 YOS 2.1% 
7 YOS 2.4% 
8 YOS 2.7% 
9 YOS 3.0% 
10 YOS 3.1% 
11 YOS 3.4% 
 




2. Life Expectancy 
Changing the life expectancy does not alter the valuation of either retirement 
system asymmetrically from the other. From a life expectancy of 60–100 years, the 
decision output remains the same for officers and enlisted. 
3. Personal Discount Rate 
The effect of the time value of money plays a role in the NPV determination. The 
personal discount rate is set to 6.4 percent for officers and 12.7 percent for enlisted 
members in accordance with the RAND study, but an increase in the rate favors the 
blended system and a decrease benefits the legacy retirement system. 
Enlisted service members in the 0–4 year cohorts change from a valuation that 
recommends the blended system to the legacy system when the personal discount rate is 
increased to at least the values in Table 9. Members in the 5–8 years of service cohorts 
should switch to the blended pension if the discount rate falls to at least the rates in Table 
9 and members of the 9–11 years of service cohorts are unaffected. 
For example, an enlisted member with two years of service should value the 
blended retirement system over the legacy pension assuming the 12.7 percent personal 
discount rate. This valuation hold true until the personal discount rate rises above 21.2 
percent, at which point the member should value the legacy retirement higher than the 
blended system. 
Officers in all cohorts receive the higher benefit from the legacy retirement 
system if the personal discount rate is increased to at least the values in Table 10. The 
critical discount rate drives both systems to a common “break-even” valuation as 
displayed in Figures 10 and 11. 
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Table 9.   Enlisted Personal Discount Rate Sensitivity 
Cohort Critical % 
0 YOS 24.9% 
1 YOS 23.8% 
2 YOS 21.2% 
3 YOS 18.7% 
4 YOS 16.0% 
5 YOS 13.2% 
6 YOS 10.3% 
7 YOS 7.4% 
8 YOS 2.4% 
9 YOS - 
10 YOS - 
11 YOS - 
 




Table 10.   Officer Personal Discount Rate Sensitivity 
Cohort Critical % 
0 YOS 20.4% 
1 YOS 20.2% 
2 YOS 20.0% 
3 YOS 19.9% 
4 YOS 18.7% 
5 YOS 17.3% 
6 YOS 16.1% 
7 YOS 14.9% 
8 YOS 14.0% 
9 YOS 13.3% 
10 YOS 12.6% 
11 YOS 12.1% 
 





The element of risk is incorporated into the model by comparing the cohort 
retention rate with the rate at 20 years of service. A risk multiplier with a low value 
indicates that the cliff-vested pension is less like to be realized in an individual career. 
Enlisted members in the 0–5 years of service cohorts benefit from the legacy 
pension system if the risk percentage rises to at least the amount in Table 11. Those in the 
6–11 years of service cohorts should switch to the blended system if the rates fall below 
the values shown in Table 11. 
For example, an enlisted member with two years of service should value the 
blended retirement system over the legacy pension assuming the 12.9 percent historical 
retention risk derived from the career survival curve. This valuation hold true until the 
retention risk rises above 28.9 percent, at which point the member should value the 
legacy retirement higher than the blended system. 
Officers change from the blended system to the legacy system when the 
likelihood of attaining 20 years of service is more probable. In order to value the legacy 
system, the risk percentage would need to rise to at least the values in Table 12. As in the 
other sensitivity categories, the critical risk rate forces the systems to a near equal value 
as displayed in Figures 12 and 13. 
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Table 11.   Enlisted Risk Sensitivity 
Cohort Historical % Critical % 
0 YOS 8.8% 28.9% 
1 YOS 9.9% 28.7% 
2 YOS 12.9% 28.9% 
3 YOS 16.8% 29.2% 
4 YOS 22.1% 29.7% 
5 YOS 27.9% 29.1% 
6 YOS 34.4% 28.5% 
7 YOS 41.1% 28.0% 
8 YOS 48.9% 27.7% 
9 YOS 55.8% 27.2% 
10 YOS 62.0% 26.7% 
11 YOS 66.6% 25.8% 
 




Table 12.   Officer Risk Sensitivity 
Cohort Historical % Critical % 
0 YOS 21.0% 65.7% 
1 YOS 21.5% 65.7% 
2 YOS 21.9% 65.7% 
3 YOS 22.1% 65.7% 
4 YOS 26.7% 69.8% 
5 YOS 31.8% 72.7% 
6 YOS 37.4% 76.3% 
7 YOS 44.0% 80.9% 
8 YOS 50.6% 85.7% 
9 YOS 56.7% 90.0% 
10 YOS 62.8% 94.3% 
11 YOS 67.1% 96.4% 
 




5. Continuation Pay Multiplier 
The continuation pay bonus used in the model is 3.37 times pay for enlisted 
members and 14 times pay for officers. These levels are projected by the RAND 
Corporation and subject to change at service discretion to meet force requirements. 
Higher rates increase the value of the blended system over the legacy pension. 
 
For enlisted members, there is no change to the NPV output for the cohorts with 
0–4 years of service. The 5 years of service cohort changes from the blended to the 
legacy system if the multiplier is reduced below 2.5 and the 6–11 cohorts change from 
the legacy system to the blended pension if the multiplier is increased to at least the 
values displayed in Table 13. 
For example, an enlisted member with 5 years of service should value the blended 
retirement system over the legacy pension assuming the 3.37 percent CP multiplier. This 
valuation hold true until the CP multiplier drops to below 2.5 percent, at which point the 
member should value the legacy retirement higher than the blended system as displayed 
in Figure 14. 
Officer cohorts with 0–5 years of service are unaffected by changes to the 
multiplier as displayed in Figure 15. However, those in the 6–11 YOS cohorts change to 
the legacy system if the multiplier is reduced to the values shown in Table 14. 
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Table 13.   Enlisted CP Multiplier Sensitivity 
Cohort Multiplier 
0 YOS - 
1 YOS - 
2 YOS - 
3 YOS - 
4 YOS - 
5 YOS 2.5 
6 YOS 6.7 
7 YOS 9.6 
8 YOS 11.8 
9 YOS 13.4 
10 YOS 14.5 
11 YOS 15.3 
 






Table 14.   Officer CP Multiplier Sensitivity 
Cohort Multiplier 
0 YOS - 
1 YOS - 
2 YOS - 
3 YOS - 
4 YOS - 
5 YOS - 
6 YOS 0.9 
7 YOS 3.4 
8 YOS 5.3 
9 YOS 6.6 
10 YOS 7.7 
11 YOS 8.5 
 





6. 401(k) Contribution 
Part of the blended retirement system is the matched 401(k) requiring the service 
member to contribute personal income, which is then matched by the government in the 
TSP account. The government contributes one percent as a minimum and up to five 
percent based on the amount the service member invests. The model assumes a three 
percent contribution by the service member (four percent provided by the government) 
but different amounts yield different valuations.  
The officer NPV decision outputs do not change between one percent and five 
percent, but some of the enlisted outputs do as seen in Figure 16. The outcome for the 0 
years of service and 6–11 years of service are unaffected by the contribution percentage. 
However, the legacy retirement system becomes the more valuable choice when the 
personal contribution percentage is reduced for the 1–5 years of service cohorts as 
displayed in Table 15. 
For example, an enlisted member with two years of service should value the 
blended retirement system over the legacy pension assuming the three percent personal 
contribution. This valuation hold true until the personal contribution drops to zero 




Table 15.   Enlisted 401(k) Contribution Sensitivity 
Cohort Contribution %  
0 YOS - 
1 YOS 0 
2 YOS 0 
3 YOS 1 
4 YOS 1 
5 YOS 2 
6 YOS - 
7 YOS - 
8 YOS - 
9 YOS - 
10 YOS - 
11 YOS - 
 





When the blended retirement system becomes available in January 2018, if 
service members prioritize the value of the two systems, incorporating the time value of 
money and risk, the following actions are recommended: 
• Enlisted with less than six years of service: Switch to the blended system 
• Enlisted with six or more years of service: Remain with the legacy 
system 
• Officers: Switch to the blended system 
Projected market return, the personal discount rate, career retention rates, the 
continuation pay multiplier, and the 401(k) contribution amount affect the valuation in 
this thesis to varying degrees. All valuations are dependent on the validity of the 
assumptions made in this model, consistent with the assumptions made by the retirement 
commission and RAND. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem stipulates that a rational decision 
maker faced with outcomes of different choices will prefer actions that maximize 
expected utility (2007). This assumes the actor is rational and has the information to 
make the decision, which is not always the case. If specified axioms are satisfied, the 
value associated with that choice is the statistical expectation of the valuation of the 
outcome of that gamble. The decision to remain with the legacy retirement system or 
switch to the blended system requires easy to understand data, tailored to each individual 
in order to facilitate rational behavior (Briggs, 2015). 
The outputs of this model are not in units that make sense when held in isolation 
and require a fundamental understanding of finance and behavioral economics. Net 
present value is an analytical construct which is only used to compare the two options of 
the mutually exclusive pensions. In addition, the service member must embrace the 
reality that certain variables in the calculations are not guaranteed. Interest rates, market 
returns and even life expectancy are all outside the influence of the member but have 
significant implications in the calculations. Some of the variables in the model are 
nebulous at best and contentious at worst, relying on generalized data based upon 
demographic stereotypes. However, this is the best lens if the education provided 
explains concepts like the personal discount rate and career retention curves. 
The results of this analysis suggest that the blended retirement system is the best 
choice for the majority of service members who have the option to switch in 2018. 
Without exception, those not intending to stay until 20 years of service should move to 
the new system. Of the remaining population, everyone other than enlisted members with 
six or more years of service benefit from the switch. However, the purpose of this thesis 
is not to provide an absolute solution for the looming decision facing service members in 
2018. It is rather a perspective based on generalized data that facilitates a baseline course 
of action and creates discussion for a very personal choice. 
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Financial education is the critical first step in the process of aiding service 
members in the decision to stay with the old or switch to the new retirement system. 
There is an opportunity to make this decision easier for service members through a web-
based and user-friendly calculator developed for use after the financial literacy training is 
complete.  
Some of the variables are highly correlated to demographic categories and it is 
therefore recommended to incorporate data like service, age, race, gender, education, 
marital status, and career specialty. These data points individualize the personal discount 
rate and retention curves used in the valuation model, providing better information on the 
margin. Service members will also have more confidence in the quality of the result 
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